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In the original round-robin differential-phase-shift (RRDPS) quantum key distribution and its
improved method, the photon-number-resolving detectors are must for the security. We present a
RRDPS protocol with yes-no detectors only. We get the upper bounds of mutual information of
Alice and Eve, and Bob and Eve, and the formula of key rate. Our main idea is to divide all counts
into two classes, the counts due to the odd number of photons incident to the detectors and the
counts due to the even number photons incident to the detectors. The fact that the bit-flip error
rate of the later class is certainly 50% makes it possible for us to perform a tightened estimation
of the upper bound of the leakage information. The robustness of original RRDPS against source
flaws such as side-channel attacks still holds for the RRDPS with yes-no detectors. The simulation
results show that the key rate of RRDPS with yes-no detectors is close to that of RRDPS with
photon-number-resolving detectors. Our results make the RRDPS protocol much more practical.
Introduction Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a information-theoretical secure key distribution method
between two parties, Alice and Bob, and the security is based on the laws of quantum physics. Since Bennett
and Brassard proposed the first QKD protocol [1], BB84 protocol, many new QKD protocols [2–12] and improved
methods [13–15] have been proposed to assure the security with imperfect devices and improve the key rate. The key of
those QKD’s security is that any eavesdropping of Eve would introduce disturbances, and we could evaluate the upper
bound of leakage information according the disturbances. Surprisingly, a QKD protocol named round robin differential
phase shift ((RRDPS)) QKD protocol [16] was proposed in which the leakage information could be evaluated without
monitoring any signal disturbance. This is so remarkable that has attracted many attentions [17–22]. Not only has
it greatly simplified to realization in practice because there is no bases-switching, but also improved the security in
side-channel aspect [20]. Notabaly, Yin et al. [21] proposed a tighter upper bound of leakage information and greatly
improved the key rate especially with small L compared with the original RRDPS.
The detectors used in original RRDPS [16, 21, 22] are photon-number-resolving (PNR) detectors.This limits the
practical application of RRDPS. Thus it is crucially important to study the RRDPS protocol with yes-no detectors
only. Here we propose such a RRDPS protocol. Our main idea is to divide all counts into two classes, the counts due
to the odd number photons incident to the detectors and the counts due to the even number photons incident to the
detectors. The fact that the bit-flip error rate of the later class is certainly 50% makes it possible for us to perform a
tightened estimation of the upper bound of the leakage information.
This paper is arranged as follows. We first introduce the original RRDPS protocol. We then present the main
results of the upper bound of leakage information and the formula of key rate of RRDPS with yes-no detectors.
After that, we present some numerical results of RRDPS with yes-no detectors and compare with RRDPS with PNR
detectors. The article ends with some concluding remarks.
Main Results As shown in Figure. 3, in the original RRDPS protocol [16], the communication parties are Alice and
Bob. Alice first prepares a train of L pulses and randomly modulates their phases into 0 or pi. If Alice’s source is
single-photon source, she will finally prepare the state as
|Ψ〉A = 1√
L
L∑
i=1
(−1)ki |i〉, (1)
where |i〉 denotes there is one photon in the ith pulse and ki is randomly 1 or 0. If Alice’s source is weak coherent
state source, the final state she prepares is
|Ψ〉′A = ⊗Li=1|(−1)kiα〉, (2)
where |α〉 denotes there is a weak coherent state pulse with intensity |α|2 in location i. Then Alice sends this L-pulses
train to Bob, and Bob performs interference measurement to the incoming pulses with the set-up shown in Figure. 3.
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FIG. 1: Alice first prepares a train of L pulses and randomly modulates their phases into 0 or pi and sends this pulses to Bob.
Bob performs interference measurement to the incoming pulses with the set-up above. In this set-up, the two detectors are
PNR detectors and the delay module will randomly produce r(r ∈ [1, L− 1]) delay. If only one detector response one time in
the whole detection process, we call this L-pulses train caused a count and Alice and Bob will record the corresponding bit as
the sifted key.
In this set-up, the two detectors are PNR detectors and the delay module will randomly produce r(r ∈ [1, L − 1])
delay. If only one detector responses one time in the whole detection process, we call this L-pulses train causes a
count and Bob will announce the detection result {a, b}, b = a+ r(mod L) to Alice through a public channel. Bob
records the measured phase difference as his sifted key bit SB and Alice records SA = ka ⊕ kb as her sifted key bit.
In the original RRDPS protocol, to evaluate the maximum leakage information, the PNR detectors are needed [16,
21, 22], or else the formula of key rate will no longer hold. But as so far, the technology of PNR detectors are difficult.
Here we study the maximum leakage information and key rate formula if the two detectors are yes-no detectors in
Figure. 3. We take the single photon case as an example to briefly introduce our conclusions, and the other cases and
detailed proof is shown in Supplementary materials.
Inspired by Ref. [21], Eve’s optimal collective attack can be given by the following equation if Alice prepares her
state as Eq. (22):
Ueve|i〉|e000〉 =
∞∑
n=0
L∑
j=1
cijn|nj〉|eijn〉, (3)
where |e000〉 is the initial state of Eve’s ancilla bits; |eijn〉 is the final state of Eve’s ancilla state after attacking and
|nj〉 represents there are n photons in the jth pulse. The coefficient cijn satisfies
∑∞
n=0
∑L
j=1 |cijn|2 = 1. While
considering the leakage information, only the states of n = 1 work if the detectors are PNR detectors, and this is just
the case of Ref. [21]. But if the detectors are yes-no detectors, we have to take all the n > 0 states into consideration.
Consider the mutual information of Alice and Eve, IAE , we have that the state of Alice and Eve after Eve’s attacking
is
|Ψ〉AE =
∞∑
n=0
L∑
i=1
L∑
j=1
(−1)kicijn|nj〉|eijn〉. (4)
If Bob measures such an incoming state and announces {a, b}, the density matrix (non-normallized) of Eve’s ancilla
bits will be [23]
ρE =
1
2
∑
n=1
{P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ian
2n
+
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ibn
2n
]
+ P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ian
2n
+
∑
i
(−1)ki(−1)n c˜ibn
2n
]},
(5)
where P (|x〉) ≡ |x〉〈x| and c˜ijn ≡ cijn|eijn〉. The first part of Eq. (27) is caused by detector D1, and the second part
is caused by detector D2. We find that the upper bounds of IAE corresponding to n = 1, 3, 5, . . . and n = 2, 4, 6, . . .
are totally different. Here we call the counting events of n = 1, 3, 5, . . . as odd-counts and the counting events of
n = 2, 4, 6, . . . as even-counts.
3If the single photon pulses train causes an odd-count, the density matrix of Eve is
ρOddE =
∑
n=Odd
{P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ian
2n
] + P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ibn
2n
]}. (6)
The value of ki(i 6= a, b) is randomly 0 or 1, thus we can average ρOddE with random ki(i 6= a, b) to simplify the
calculation. Without compromising the security, we can assume
〈eijn|eklm〉 = δikδjlδnm. (7)
Finally only the states P [ c˜aan2n ± c˜ban2n ] and P [ c˜abn2n ± c˜bbn2n ] accounts for the Holevo bound which measures the maximum
mutual information of two parties if they share a system in quantum information. Thus we can get the upper bound
of IAE
IOddAE ≤ φ(1, L) = Maxx1,x2
ϕ((L − 1)x1, x2)
L− 1 , (8)
where ϕ(x, y) = −x log2 x−y log2 y+(x+y) log2 (x+ y) and x1+x2 = 1. Note that the assumption of Eq. (34) would
certainly introduce 50% bit-flip error rate, thus Eq. (8) shows that the maximum leakage information of odd-counts is
limited even if Eve’s attack is optimal and introduces 50% bit-flip error rate. And in general case, φ(1, L) < H( 1L−1 ),
where H(x) is Shannon entropy, H(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2 (1− x), and H( 1L−1) is the upper bound of leakage
information proposed in original RRDPS [16].
In Supplementary materials, we prove that if the single photon pulses train causes an even-count, the upper bound
of IEvenAE equals 1. Dose this mean that we can not extract any secure final keys if we don’t know whether the counts
is an odd-count or even-count? Luckily, the answer is no. We next consider the mutual information of Bob and Eve,
IBE . If the count {a, b} is detected by D1, the density matrix of Eve is
ρD1E =
∑
n=1
P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ian
2n
+
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ibn
2n
]. (9)
If the count {a, b} is detected by D2, the density matrix of Eve is
ρD2E =
∑
n=1
P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ian
2n
+
∑
i
(−1)ki(−1)n c˜ibn
2n
]. (10)
From Eqs. (52) and (55), it is easy to see that ρD1E and ρ
D2
E are the same if n are even numbers, which means Eve
can not distinguish whether an even-count is caused by D1 or D2 at all, thus I
Even
BE = 0. Different from the situation
of IOddAE , this result needs not the average of random phase and orthogonality assumption Eq. (34). If the single photon
cause an odd-count, the upper bound of IOddBE equals 1. The detailed proof of single photon case and other general
cases are shown in Supplementary materials.
We list the main results as following:
If Alice sends out a train of L pulses contained N(N ≤ L2 ) photons, and Bob announces this pulses train causes a
count, the upper bounds of mutual information of Alice and Eve, IAE , and the mutual information of Bob and Eve,
IBE , are
IOddAE (N) ≤ φ(N,L), IEvenBE (N) = 0, (11)
where
φ(N,L) = max
x1,x2,...,xN+1

N∑
k=1
ϕ((L − k)xk, kxk+1)
L− 1
 , (12)
and
∑N+1
k=1 xk = 1. And I
Even
AE = 1, I
odd
BE = 1.
In short, I. If the train causes an odd-count, the maximum mutual information of Alice and Eve is φ(N,L), but
the maximum mutual information of Bob and Eve is 1. II. If the train causes an even-count, the maximum mutual
information of Bob and Eve is 0, but the maximum mutual information of Alice and Eve is 1. This means if the
4final counts contain many odd-counts, the mutual information of Alice and Eve is relatively small while the mutual
information of Bob and Eve is pretty large, and vice versa. Thus if the error correction step is based on Alice’s
or Bob’s sifted raw key bits, the final key bits we extract must be zero, since we have no idea about the ratio of
odd-counts or even-counts. But if the sifted raw key bits are randomly split into two parts, the first part accounts for
γ, and the second part accounts for 1− γ. The error correction of the first part is based on Alice’s sifted raw key bits
and the second part is based on Bob’s sifted raw key bits. The final key rate is
LR = max
γ
{γmax[IAB − IAE , 0]
+ (1− γ)max[IAB − IBE , 0]}.
(13)
And in general case, at least one of IAB − IAE and IAB − IBE is greater than zero.
If Alice’s source is weak coherent state source, and she randomly modulates the mutual phase the different pulses
in the train, the state that she prepares is equivalent to the classical mixture of different photon numbers. And the
density matrix of the pulses train with intensity µ in photon number space is
ρ(µ) =
∑
k=0
ak|k〉〈k|, ak = µ
ke−µ
k!
. (14)
We denote the total counting rate and error rate of the L-pulses train are Q and E, and the counting rate and error
rate of k-photons L-pulses train are Yk and ek, in which the ratio of odd-counts is αk and even-counts is βk = 1−αk,
we have
IAE ≤
∑
n=1
anYn[αnφ(n, L) + βn]
=
nth∑
n=1
anYn[αnφ(n, L) + βn] +
∑
n>nth
anYn
≤α(Q − esrc)φ(nth, L) + β(Q − esrc) + esrc,
(15)
where esrc =
∑
n>nth
an and α+ β = 1. We use a fact in the last step of Eq. (15)
nth∑
n=0
anYnαn +
nth∑
n=0
anYnβn =
nth∑
n=0
anYn ≥ Q − esrc.
And similarly we have
IBE ≤ α(Q − esrc) + esrc. (16)
Here the nth is the boundary of tagged photons (n > nth) and untagged photons (n ≥ nth) and will be an optimized
parameters in the simulation parts to get a better key rate.
The Eqs. (52) and (55) show us an important fact that if a single photon count is an even-count, its bit-flip error
rate definitely is 1/2, whether Eve attacks it or not. This is different from the case of odd-counts, where the bit-flip
error rate is 1/2 only if Eve attacks all the key bits with his optimal attack strategy. And we show that this fact holds
for any k−photon counts in Supplementary materials. In fact, we can assume Eve’s attacks introduce eoddk bit-flip
error rate of the odd-counts, and we have
αke
odd
k +
1
2
βk = ek, (17)
which implies βk ≤ 2ek. Thus we have β(Q − esrc) ≤ 2EQ, which implies
α ≥ 1− 2EQ
Q− esrc , (18)
if Q− esrc > 0.
Combine Eqs. (13)-(16) and we could get the final key rate with observable values of experiment. Finally, we have
the following formulas of final key rate
LR = max
γ
min
α
{γmax[R1(α), 0] + (1 − γ)max[R2(α), 0]},
s.t. 1− 2EQ
Q− esrc ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
R1(α) = α(Q − esrc)(1 − φ(nth, L))− fQH(E),
R2(α) = (1− α)(Q − esrc)− fQH(E).
(19)
5ηd pd f e0 αf
40% 1.0 × 10−7 1.15 0.5 0.2
TABLE I: List of experimental parameters used in numerical simulations. ηd: the detection efficiency of Bob’s detectors; pd:
the dark counting rate of the Bob’s detectors; f : the error correction inefficiency; e0: error rate of the vacuum count; αf : the
fiber loss coefficient (dB/km).
Ed µ αmin α γ L nth R
1.5% 8.89 0.97 0.97 1.0 93 19 4.12× 10−5
3.0% 6.02 0.94 0.94 1.0 97 15 2.50× 10−5
6.0% 2.35 0.87 0.87 1.0 96 9 7.52× 10−6
10.0% 0.54 0.79 0.79 1.0 97 5 5.42× 10−7
TABLE II: List of optimal parameters and the corresponding key rate in different miallignment-error probability, Ed. Here,
we set the distance between Alice and Bob is 100 km, and µ: the intensity of the phase-randomized weak coherent state pulses
train; αmin: the min value of α constrained by Eq. (18); αbest: the optimal value of α according to our optimized algorithm; γ:
the accounts of the part that the error correction is based on Alice’s data, and defined in Eq. (13); L: the length of the pulses
train; nth: the boundary of tagged and untagged photons; R: the final key rate.
Numerical Simulation We then show some numerical results and compare with the results of RRDPS with PNR
detectors [21]. To clearly show the advantage of our method, we assume the properties of Bob’s yes-no detectors
and PNR detectors including the repetitive rate, detection efficiency and dark counting rate, are the same. Besides,
we assume the PNR detectors could discriminate the single photon from zero, two or more photons perfectly. The
performance parameters of the detectors and other experiment devices are list in Table. I. We use the linear model
to simulate the observed values of the counting rate, Q, and error rate, E, of the L-pulses train, and the detailed of
our numerical simulation method are shown in the Supplementary materials.
We list some optimal parameters and their corresponding key rate under different misalignment-error probability,
Ed, in Table. II. Here we set the distance between Alice and Bob is 100 km. The data in Table. II show that the
while Ed = 1.5%, 3.0%, 6.0%, 10.0%, optimal γ = 1 and αbest = αmin, where αmin is the min value of α constrained
by Eq. (18) and αbest is the optimal value of α according to our optimized algorithm. This implies that we can always
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FIG. 2: The key rates of the original RRDPS with PNR detectors and our protocol with yes-no detectors versus the distance
between Alice and Bob. The green line is the decent degree of the RRDPS with yes-no detectors compared with the key rate
of RRDPS with PNR detectors. Here we set the misalignment-error probability, Ed, as 1.5%.
6set γ = 1 and α = 1− 2EQQ−esrc in the key rate formula of Eq. (85). Besides, we have the following fact that:
max
γ
min
α
{γmax[R1(α), 0] + (1 − γ)max[R2(α), 0]}
≥ R1(1− 2EQ
Q− esrc ),
where α is in the range constrained by Eq. (85). Thus without comprising the security, we can rewrite the formula of
key rate in Eq. (85) as
LR = [(1− 2E)Q− esrc][1− φ(nth, L)]− fQH(E). (20)
And in general case, the key rate calculated by Eq. (20) is the same as Eq. (85) with the same experiment conditions.
Fig. 2 shows the key rates of the original RRDPS with PNR detectors and our protocol with yes-no detectors
versus the distance between Alice and Bob, where we set the misalignment-error probability, Ed, as 0.015. The blue
solid line is the results of RRDPS with PNR detectors and the red dashed line is the results of RRDPS with yes-no
detectors. Those two line is almost overlapped except the tail of the lines. The green solid line is the decent degree of
the RRDPS with yes-no detectors compared with the key rate of RRDPS with PNR detectors, which clearly shows
that their key rates differ less than 10% with the distance of Alice and Bob range in 0 − 175 km. This results are
intuitive since the formula of key rate with PNR detectors proposed in Ref. [21] is
LRPNR = (Q− esrc)[1− φ(nth, L)]− fQH(E). (21)
The only difference between Eq. (20) and Eq. (21) is the coefficient, 1 − 2E, of Q. Thus the results of RRDPS with
yes-no detectors and PNR detectors are almost the same if the bit-flip error rate E is small.
Conclusion We present a protocol for RRDPS with yes-no detectors and the upper bounds of mutual information of
Alice and Eve, and Bob and Eve as shown in Eq. (11). We present the formula of key rate of RRDPS with yes-no
detectors by Eqs. (85) and (20). Our main idea is to divide all counts into two classes, the counts due to the odd
number photons incident to the detectors and the counts due to the even number photons incident to the detectors.
The fact that the bit-flip error rate of the later class is certainly 50% makes it possible for us to perform a tightened
estimation of the upper bound of the leakage information. The major advantages of the original RRDPS protocol,
the realization simplicity without bases switching and the source side-channel-free property hold in our protocol. The
simulation results show that the key rate of RRDPS with yes-no detectors is close to that of RRDPS with PNR
detectors.
I. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
II. THE UPPER BOUND OF LEAKAGE INFORMATION IN THE SINGLE-PHOTON CASE
As shown in Figure. 3, Alice first prepares a train of L pulses and randomly modulate their phases. If Alice’s source
is single-photon source, the state she finally prepares is
|Ψ〉A = 1√
L
L∑
i=1
(−1)ki |i〉, (22)
where |i〉 denotes there is one photon in the ith pulse and ki is randomly 1 or 0. Inspired by the method of evaluating
the upper boung of leakage information in Ref. [21], Eve’s optimal collective attack can be given by the following
equation for the state shown in Eq. (22):
Ueve|i〉|e000〉 =
∞∑
n=0
L∑
j=1
cijn|nj〉|eijn〉, (23)
where |e000〉 is the initial state of Eve’s ancilla bits; |eijn〉 is the final state of Eve’s ancilla bits after attacking and |nj〉
denotes there are n photons in location j. The coefficient cijn satisfies
∑∞
n=0
∑L
j=1 |cijn|2 = 1. After Eve’s attacking,
the state of Alice and Eve (unnormalized) is
|Ψ〉AE =
∞∑
n=0
L∑
i=1
L∑
j=1
(−1)kicijn|nj〉|eijn〉. (24)
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FIG. 3: Experiment set-ups of RRDPS. Alice first prepares a train of L pulses and randomly modulates their phases. Then
Alice sends this L-pulses train to Bob, and Bob performs interference measurement to the incoming pulses. If this L-pulses
train causes a count, Bob will announce the location of this counts {a, b}.Bob records the measured phase difference as his
sifted key bit SB and Alice records SA = ka ⊕ kb as her sifted key bit.
Through Bob’s detection set-up, the state of Eq. (24) is involved into
→
∑
ijn
(−1)ki c˜ijn
dˆ†,nj√
n!
|0〉, (25)
→
∑
ijn
(−1)ki c˜ijn 1
2n
√
n!
(dˆ†j+r + eˆ
†
j+r + dˆ
†
j − eˆ†j)n|0〉 ≡ |Ψ〉detectAE , (26)
where c˜ijn ≡ cijn|eijn〉 and r is randomly chosen from 1, 2, . . . , L− 1.
A. The mutual information of Alice and Eve
We first consider the upper bound of mutual information of Alice and Eve, IAE . If only one of Bob’s detectors
responses in location k, then only the states with superscript j = k − r or j = k account. We denote a = k − r and
b = k, the density matrix of Eve’s ancilla bits is
ρE =
1
2
∑
n=1
{P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ian
2n
+
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ibn
2n
] + P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ian
2n
+
∑
i
(−1)ki(−1)n c˜ibn
2n
]} (27)
where P (|x〉) ≡ |x〉〈x|. The first part of Eq. (27) is caused by detector D1, and the second part is caused by detector
D2. We find that the upper bounds of IAE for the case n = 1, 3, 5, . . . or n = 2, 4, 6, . . . are totally different. Here we
call the counting event of n = 1, 3, 5, . . . as odd-count and the counting event of n = 2, 4, 6, . . . as even-count.
1. The mutual information of Alice and Eve with odd-count
If the single photon pulses train causes an odd-count, the density matrix of Eve is
ρOddE =
∑
n=Odd
{P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ian
2n
] + P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ibn
2n
]}. (28)
The value of ki, (i 6= a, b) is randomly 0 or 1, thus we can average ρOddE with random ki, (i 6= a, b) to simplify the
calculation. We denote
ρa,bn = P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ian
2n
] + P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ibn
2n
], (29)
8and then we have
ρa,bn =
1
2(L− 2)
∑
j 6=a,b
∑
kj=0,1
{P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ian
2n
] + P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ibn
2n
]}
= P [
(−1)ka c˜aan
2n
+
(−1)kb c˜ban
2n
] + P [
(−1)ka c˜abn
2n
+
(−1)kb c˜bbn
2n
] +
∑
i6=a,b
{c
2
ian
4n
P (|eian〉) + c
2
ibn
4n
P (|eibn〉)}.
(30)
If ka ⊕ kb = 0, ρa,bn will be
ρa,b0,n = P [
c˜aan
2n
+
c˜ban
2n
] + P [
c˜abn
2n
+
c˜bbn
2n
] +
∑
i6=a,b
{c
2
ian
4n
P (|eian〉) + c
2
ibn
4n
P (|eibn〉)} (31)
if ka ⊕ kb = 1, ρa,bn will be
ρa,b1,n = P [
c˜aan
2n
− c˜ban
2n
] + P [
c˜abn
2n
− c˜bbn
2n
] +
∑
i6=a,b
{c
2
ian
4n
P (|eian〉) + c
2
ibn
4n
P (|eibn〉)}. (32)
The mutual information of Alice and Eve if Bob announce {a, b}, Ia,bAE , could be calculated by the Holevo bound
Ia,bAE ≤ S[
∑
n=odd
1
2Qab
(ρa,b0,n + ρ
a,b
1,n)]−
1
2
S[
1
Qab
∑
n=odd
ρa,b0,n]−
1
2
S[
1
Qab
∑
n=odd
ρa,b1,n]. (33)
Without compromising the security [21], we can assume
〈eijn|eklm〉 = δikδjlδnm. (34)
Then we could get the upper bound of Ia,bAE
QabI
a,b
AE ≤
∑
n=odd
(
−c
2
aan
4n
log2
c2aan
4n
− c
2
ban
4n
log2
c2ban
4n
+
c2aan + c
2
ban
4n
log2
c2aan + c
2
ban
4n
−c
2
abn
4n
log2
c2abn
4n
− c
2
bbn
4n
log2
c2bbn
4n
+
c2abn + c
2
bbn
4n
log2
c2abn + c
2
bbn
4n
)
=
∑
n=odd
[ϕ(
c2aan
4n
,
c2ban
4n
) + ϕ(
c2bbn
4n
,
c2abn
4n
)],
(35)
where
Qab =
∑
n=odd
∑
i
(
c2ian
4n
+
c2ibn
4n
) (36)
ϕ(x, y) = −xlog2x− ylog2(y) + (x+ y)log2(x+ y) (37)
If we denote p2ij =
∑
n=odd
c2ijn
4n , with the concavity of ϕ(x, y) and Jensens inequality, we have
QabI
a,b
AE ≤ ϕ(p2aa, p2ba) + ϕ(p2bb, p2ab) (38)
where
Qab =
∑
i
(p2ia + p
2
ib) (39)
The Eq. (38) is the same as Eq. (7) of the security proof in the single-photon case of Ref. [21]. The upper bound of
9IOddAE is
IOddAE =
∑
a<bQabI
a,b
AE∑
a<bQab
≤
∑
a<b ϕ(p
2
aa, p
2
ba) + ϕ(p
2
bb, p
2
ab)∑
a<bQab
≤ ϕ(
∑
a<b p
2
aa + p
2
bb,
∑
a<b p
2
ba + p
2
ab)∑
a<bQab
=
ϕ[(L− 1)∑i p2ii,∑i6=j p2ij ]
(L − 1)(∑i p2ii +∑i6=j p2ij)
=
ϕ[(L− 1)x1, x2]
(L − 1)(x1 + x2) ,
(40)
where x1 =
∑
i p
2
ii and x2 =
∑
i6=j p
2
ij . By maximizing the value of
ϕ[(L−1)x1,x2]
(L−1)(x1+x2)
for all x1 > 0 and x2 > 0, we could
get the upper bound of IOddAE .
2. The mutual information of Alice and Eve with even-count
In this part, we want to prove that if the single-photon pulses train causes an even-count, Eve will have all
information of Alice’s raw key bits. Or in other word, the supremum of IEvenAE equals 1. According to Eq. (27), if n is
an even number, the density matrix of Eve’s ancilla bits will be
ρE =
∑
n=even
{P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ian
2n
+
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ibn
2n
]}. (41)
We set cijn = 0 if n 6= 2 or i 6= j, and cii2 = c. Then ρE will be the following simple form
ρE = P [(−1)ki c˜aa2
4
+ (−1)kb c˜bb2
4
]. (42)
If ka ⊕ kb = 0,
ρ0E = P [
c˜aa2
4
+
c˜bb2
4
]. (43)
If ka ⊕ kb = 1,
ρ1E = P [
c˜aa2
4
− c˜bb2
4
]. (44)
The mutual information of Alice and Eve if Bob announce {a, b}, Ia,bAE , could be calculated by the Holevo bound
Ia,bAE ≤ S[
1
2Qab
(ρ0E + ρ
1
E)]−
1
2
S[
1
Qab
ρ0E ]−
1
2
S[
1
Qab
ρ1E ] = 1, (45)
where Qab =
c2
8 . Here we use the orthogonality condition Eq. (34). Thus the upper bound of I
even
AE is
IOddAE =
∑
a<bQabI
a,b
AE∑
a<bQab
≤ 1. (46)
The only inequality we use here is Holevo bound, thus the supremum of IEvenAE equals 1.
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3. The mutual information of Bob and Eve
If the single photon pulses train causes a count in detector D1, the density matrix of Eve is
ρD1E =
∑
n=1
P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ian
2n
+
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ibn
2n
]. (47)
If the single photon pulses train causes a count in detector D2, the density matrix of Eve is
ρD2E =
∑
n=1
P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ian
2n
+
∑
i
(−1)ki(−1)n c˜ibn
2n
]. (48)
It is easy to see that ρD1E and ρ
D2
E are the same if n is even, which means Eve can not distinguish whether an even-
count is caused by D1 or D2 at all, thus I
Even
BE = 0. Different from the situation of I
Odd
AE , this result need not the
average of random phase and orthogonality assumption Eq. (34). Similar to the case of mutual information of Alice
and Eve with even-counts, we want to prove that if the single-photon pulses train causes an odd-count, Eve will have
all information of Bob’s raw key bits. If n is odd, ρD1E and ρ
D2
E will be
ρD1E =
∑
n=odd
P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ian
2n
+
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ibn
2n
], (49)
ρD2E =
∑
n=odd
P [
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ian
2n
−
∑
i
(−1)ki c˜ibn
2n
]. (50)
If we set cijn = 0 if n 6= 1 or i 6= j, and cii1 = c, ρD1E and ρD2E will be
ρD1E = P [
c˜aa1
2
+ (−1)ka+kb c˜bb1
2
], ρD2E = P [
c˜aa1
2
− (−1)ka+kb c˜bb1
2
]. (51)
Since the states of ρD1E and ρ
D2
E with assumption Eq. (34) are two orthometric pure states, I
a,b
BE ≤ 1. And thus
IOddBE ≤ 1.
III. THE UPPER BOUND OF LEAKAGE INFORMATION IN GENERAL CASE
In this part we want to evaluate the upper bound of leakage information in general case. We have shown that if
the single-photon pulses train causes an even-count, the mutual information of Alice and Eve is up to 1, and if the
single-photon pulses train causes an odd-count, the mutual information of Bob and Eve is up to 1. Honestly speaking,
this is a trivial conclusion, thus we will focus on the upper bounds of mutual information of Alice and Eve if the pulses
train causes an odd-count and the mutual information of Bob and Eve if the pulses train causes an even-count. Same
as the method in Ref. [21], we will prove this in two cases, N is an odd number and N is an even number, where N
denotes Alice sends out a N -photons L-pulses train. We assume N ≤ L/2 in this part.
A. The upper bound of leakage information if N is an odd number
If Alice prepares a N -photon L-pulses train where N is an odd number, the state will be
|Ψ〉A =
∑
i1
(−1)ki1 |i1〉+
∑
i1<i2<i3
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3 |i1i2i3〉+ · · ·+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3+···+kiN |i1i2i3 · · · iN〉,
(52)
where |i1i2i3 · · · ik〉 represents a sum of all states that there are odd number photons in the i1, i2, i3, . . . , ik-th pulses
and there are even number photons in the other pulses of the L-pulses train, for k = 1, 3, 5, . . . , N . Eve’s optimal
collective attack can be given by the following equation for the state shown in Eq. (52):
Ueve|i1i2i3 · · · ik〉|eancilla〉 =
∞∑
n=0
L∑
t=1
ci1i2···iktn|nt〉|ei1i2···iktn〉, (53)
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and we denote
c˜i1i2···iktn ≡ ci1i2···iktn|ei1i2···iktn〉, (54)
for k = 1, 3, 5, . . . , N . Then Alice and Eve will share the following entanglement state
|Ψ〉AE =
∞∑
n=0
L∑
t=1
[∑
i1
(−1)ki1 c˜i1tn +
∑
i1<i2<i3
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3 c˜i1i2i3tn + · · ·
+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3+···+kiN c˜i1i2i3···iN tn ] |nt〉
(55)
Further, we denote
c˜tn =
∑
i1
(−1)ki1 c˜i1tn +
∑
i1<i2<i3
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3 c˜i1i2i3tn + · · ·+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3+···+kiN c˜i1i2i3···iN tn,
(56)
Through Bob’s detection set-up, the state of Eq. (55) is involved into
|Ψ〉AE =
∞∑
n=0
L∑
t=1
c˜tn|nt〉 (57)
→
∑
tn
c˜tn
dˆ†,nt√
n!
|0〉 (58)
→
∑
tn
c˜tn
1
2n
√
n!
(dˆ†t+r + eˆ
†
t+r + dˆ
†
t − eˆ†t )n|0〉 ≡ |Ψ〉detectAE . (59)
If only one of Bob’s detectors responses in location k and we denote a = k − r, b = k, the density matrix of Eve’s
ancilla bits is
ρE =
1
2
∑
n=1
{P (c˜an + c˜bn) + P [c˜an + (−1)nc˜bn]} (60)
The first part of Eq. (60) is caused by detector D1, and the second part is caused by detector D2. It is easy to see that
those two parts are the same if n is an even and thus IEvenBE (N)=0. If n is odd, we have the following consideration
to evaluate the upper bound of mutual information of Alice and Eve.
ρE =
∑
n=odd
P (c˜an) + P (c˜bn). (61)
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We first transform P (c˜an) and P (c˜bn) into
P (c˜an) =P{
∑
i1
(−1)ki1 c˜i1an +
∑
i1<i2<i3
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3 c˜i1i2i3an + · · ·
+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3+···+kiN c˜i1i2i3···iNan}
=P{(−1)ka c˜aan + (−1)kb c˜ban
+
∑
i1 6=a,b
(−1)ki [c˜i1an + (−1)ka+kb c˜i1aban]
+
∑
i1<i2,i1,i2 6=a,b
(−1)ki1+ki2 [(−1)ka c˜i1i2aan + (−1)kb c˜i1i2ban]
+
∑
i1<i2<i3
i1,i2,i3 6=a,b
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3 [(−1)ka+kb c˜i1i2i3aban + c˜i1i2i3an]
+
∑
i1<i2<i3<i4
i1,i2,i3,i4 6=a,b
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3+ki4 [(−1)ka c˜i1i2i3i4aan + (−1)kb c˜i1i2i3i4ban]
+ . . . . . .
+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN−1
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3+···+kiN−1 [(−1)ka c˜i1i2i3···iN−1aan + (−1)kb c˜i1i2i3···iN−1ban]∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN
i1,i2,··· ,iN 6=a,b
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3+···+kiN c˜i1i2i3···iNan
(62)
The value of ki, (i 6= a, b) is randomly 0 or 1, thus we have
P (c˜an) = P [(−1)ka c˜aan + (−1)kb c˜ban] +
∑
i1 6=a,b
P [c˜i1an + (−1)ka+kb c˜i1aban]
+
∑
i1<i2,i1,i2 6=a,b
P [(−1)ka c˜i1i2aan + (−1)kb c˜i1i2ban] +
∑
i1<i2<i3
i1,i2,i3 6=a,b
P [(−1)ka+kb c˜i1i2i3aban + c˜i1i2i3an]
+
∑
i1<i2<i3<i4
i1,i2,i3,i4 6=a,b
P [(−1)ka c˜i1i2i3i4aan + (−1)kb c˜i1i2i3i4ban] + . . . . . .
+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN−1
i1,i2,··· ,iN−1 6=a,b
P [(−1)ka c˜i1i2i3···iN−1aan + (−1)kb c˜i1i2i3···iN−1ban]
+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN
i1,i2,··· ,iN 6=a,b
P (c˜i1i2i3···iNan)
(63)
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Similarly, P (c˜bn) could be transformed into the following form
P (c˜bn) = P [(−1)ka c˜abn + (−1)kb c˜bbn] +
∑
i1 6=a,b
P [c˜i1bn + (−1)ka+kb c˜i1abbn]
+
∑
i1<i2,i1,i2 6=a,b
P [(−1)ka c˜i1i2abn + (−1)kb c˜i1i2bbn] +
∑
i1<i2<i3
i1,i2,i3 6=a,b
P [(−1)ka+kb c˜i1i2i3abbn + c˜i1i2i3bn]
+
∑
i1<i2<i3<i4
i1,i2,i3,i4 6=a,b
P [(−1)ka c˜i1i2i3i4abn + (−1)kb c˜i1i2i3i4bbn] + . . . . . .
+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN−1
i1,i2,··· ,iN−1 6=a,b
P [(−1)ka c˜i1i2i3···iN−1abn + (−1)kb c˜i1i2i3···iN−1bbn]
+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN
i1,i2,··· ,iN 6=a,b
P (c˜i1i2i3···iNbn)
(64)
We denote ρE as ρ
0
E if ka ⊕ kb = 0 and ρE as ρ1E if ka ⊕ kb = 1, thus the mutual information of Alice and Eve if Bob
announces {a, b}, Ia,bAE is
Ia,bA,E ≤ S[
1
2Qab
(ρ0E + ρ
1
E)]−
1
2
S[
ρ0E
Qab
]− 1
2
S[
ρ1E
Qab
], (65)
where
Qab =
∑
n=odd
[
∑
i1
(|c˜i1an|2+|c˜i1bn|2)+
∑
i1<i2<i3
(|c˜i1i2i3an|2+|c˜i1i2i3bn|2)+· · ·+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN
(|c˜i1i2i3···iNan|2+|c˜i1i2i3···iN bn|2)].
(66)
We denote p2i1i2i3···ikt =
∑
n=odd |c˜i1i2i3···iktn|2 where k = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N . And the upper bound of IAE is
IAE =
∑
a<bQabI
a,b
AE∑
a<bQab
≤ 1∑
a<bQab
∑
a<b
∑
n=odd
[ϕ(|c˜aan|2 + |c˜bbn|2, |c˜abn|2 + |c˜ban|2)
+
∑
i1 6=a,b
ϕ(|c˜i1an|2 + |c˜i1bn|2, |c˜i1aban|2 + |c˜i1abbn|2)
+
∑
i1<i2,i1,i2 6=a,b
ϕ(|c˜i1i2aan|2 + |c˜i1i2bbn|2, |c˜i1i2abn|2 + |c˜i1i2ban|2)
+
∑
i1<i2<i3
i1,i2i3 6=a,b
ϕ(|c˜i1i2i3an|2 + |c˜i1i2i3bn|2, |c˜i1i2i3aban|2 + |c˜i1i2i3abbn|2) + . . . . . .
+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN−1
i1,i2,··· ,iN−1 6=a,b
ϕ(|c˜i1i2i3···iN−1aan|2 + |c˜i1i2i3···iN−1bbn|2, c˜i1i2i3···iN−1abn|2 + |c˜i1i2i3···iN−1ban|2)]
≤ 1∑
a<bQab
∑
a<b
[ϕ(p2aa + p
2
bb, p
2
ab + p
2
ba) +
∑
i1 6=a,b
ϕ(p2i1a + p
2
i1b, p
2
i1aba + p
2
i1abb)
+
∑
i1<i2,i1,i2 6=a,b
ϕ(p2i1i2aa + p
2
i1i2bb, p
2
i1i2ab + p
2
i1i2ba) +
∑
i1<i2<i3
i1,i2i3 6=a,b
ϕ(p2i1i2i3a + p
2
i1i2i3b, p
2
i1i2i3aba + p
2
i1i2i3abb)
+ . . . · · ·+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN−1
i1,i2,··· ,iN−1 6=a,b
ϕ(p2i1i2i3···iN−1aa + p
2
i1i2i3···iN−1bb, p
2
i1i2i3···iN−1ab + p
2
i1i2i3···iN−1ba)].
(67)
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As shown in Eq. (44) of supplementary note of Ref. [21], we have the following mathematical identities∑
a<b
p2aa + p
2
bb = (L− 1)
∑
i1
p2i1i1∑
a<b
p2ab + p
2
ba =
∑
i1
∑
i2 6=i1
p2i1i2∑
a<b
∑
i1 6=a,b
p2i1a + p
2
i1b = (L− 2)
∑
i1
∑
i2 6=i1
p2i1i2∑
a<b
∑
i1<i2<···<ik
i1,i2,...,ik 6=a,b
p2i1i2···ika + p
2
i1i2···ikb = (L− k − 1)
∑
i1<i2<···<ik
∑
t6=i1,i2,...,ik
p2i1i2···ikt
∑
a<b
∑
i1<i2<···<ik
i1,i2,...,ik 6=a,b
p2i1i2···ikaba + p
2
i1i2···ikabb = (k + 1)
∑
i1<i2<···<ik+2
ik+2∑
t=i1
p2i1i2···ik+2t
∑
a<b
∑
i1<i2<···<ik+1
i1,i2,...,ik+1 6=a,b
p2i1i2···ik+1aa + p
2
i1i2···ik+1bb
= (L− k − 2)
∑
i1<i2<···<ik+2
ik+2∑
t=i1
p2i1i2···ik+2t
∑
a<b
∑
i1<i2<···<ik+1
i1,i2,...,ik+1 6=a,b
p2i1i2···ik+1ab + p
2
i1i2···ik+1ba
= (k + 2)
∑
i1<i2<···<ik+2
∑
t6=i1··· ,ik+2
p2i1i2···ik+2t,
where k = 1, 3, 5, . . . , N . And we define
x1 ≡
∑
i1
p2i1i1
x2 ≡
∑
i1 6=i2
p2i1i2
xk ≡
∑
i1<i2<···<ik
ik∑
t=i1
p2i1i2···ikt
xk+1 ≡
∑
i1<i2<···<ik
∑
t6=i1,...,ik
p2i1i2···ikt
It is easy to check
∑
a<bQab = (L− 1)(x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xN+1). With the concavity of ϕ(x, y) and Jensens inequality,
we have
IAE ≤
∑N
k=1 ϕ[(L − k)xk, kxk+1]
(L− 1)∑N+1k=1 xk , (68)
By searching the maximum value of Eq. (68) in non-negative spaces,we could get the upper bound of IAE .
B. The upper bound of leakage information if N is an even number
If Alice prepares a N -photon L-pulses train where N is an even number, the state will be
|Ψ〉A =|i1〉+
∑
i1<i2
(−1)ki1+ki2 |i1i2〉+
∑
i1<i2<i3<i4
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3+ki4 |i1i2i3i4〉+ · · ·
+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3+···+kiN |i1i2i3 · · · iN 〉,
(69)
where |i1i2i3 · · · ik〉 represents a sum of all states that there are odd number photons in the i1, i2, i3, . . . , ik-th pulses
and there are even number photons in the other pulses of the L-pulses train, for k = 2, 4, 6, . . . , N . And |i1〉 represents
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a sum of all states that there are only even number photons in any pulse. Similarly to Eqs. (53) and (54), Eve’s
optimal collective attack is
Ueve|i1i2 · · · ik〉|eancilla〉 =
∞∑
n=0
L∑
t=1
c˜i1i2···iktn|nt〉, (70)
for k = 1, 2, 4, 6, . . . , N . And similarly to Eqs. (55)-(60), if only one of Bob’s detectors responses in location k and we
denote a = k − r, b = k, the density matrix of Eve’s ancilla bits is
ρE =
1
2
∑
n=1
{P (c˜an + c˜bn) + P [c˜an + (−1)nc˜bn]} (71)
The first part of Eq. (71) is caused by detector D1, and the second part is caused by detector D2. It is easy to see
that those two parts are the same if n is even and thus IEvenBE (N)=0. If n is odd, we have the following consideration
to evaluate the upper bound of mutual information of Alice and Eve.
ρE =
∑
n=odd
P (c˜an) + P (c˜bn), (72)
where
P (c˜an) =P{c˜i1an +
∑
i1<i2
(−1)ki1+ki2 c˜i1i2an|i1i2〉+
∑
i1<i2<i3<i4
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3+ki4 c˜i1i2i3i4an|i1i2i3i4〉+ · · ·
+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3+···+kiN c˜i1i2i3···iNan|i1i2i3 · · · iN 〉}
=P{c˜i1an + (−1)ka+kb c˜aban
+
∑
i1 6=a,b
(−1)ki [(−1)ka c˜i1aan + (−1)kb c˜i1ban]
+
∑
i1<i2,i1,i2 6=a,b
(−1)ki1+ki2 (c˜i1i2an + (−1)ka+kb c˜i1i2aban)
+
∑
i1<i2<i3
i1,i2,i3 6=a,b
(−1)ki1+ki2+ki3 [(−1)ka c˜i1i2i3aan + (−1)kb c˜i1i2i3ban] + · · ·
+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN−1
i1,i2,...iN−1 6=a,b
(−1)ki1+ki2+···+kiN−1 [(−1)ka c˜i1i2···iN−1aan + (−1)kb c˜i1i2···iN−1ban]
+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN
i1,i2,...iN 6=a,b
(−1)ki1+ki2+···+kiN c˜i1i2···iNan}
(73)
The value of ki, (i 6= a, b) is randomly 0 or 1, thus we have
P (c˜an) =P [c˜i1an + (−1)ka+kb c˜aban] +
∑
i1 6=a,b
P [(−1)ka c˜i1aan + (−1)kb c˜i1ban]
+
∑
i1<i2,i1,i2 6=a,b
P [c˜i1i2an + (−1)ka+kb c˜i1i2aban] +
∑
i1<i2<i3
i1,i2,i3 6=a,b
P [(−1)ka c˜i1i2i3aan + (−1)kb c˜i1i2i3ban]
+ · · ·+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN−1
i1,i2,...iN−1 6=a,b
P [(−1)ka c˜i1i2···iN−1aan + (−1)kb c˜i1i2···iN−1ban] +
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN
i1,i2,...iN 6=a,b
P (c˜i1i2···iNan)
(74)
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Similarly,
P (c˜bn) =P [c˜i1bn + (−1)ka+kb c˜abbn] +
∑
i1 6=a,b
P [(−1)ka c˜i1abn + (−1)kb c˜i1bbn]
+
∑
i1<i2,i1,i2 6=a,b
P [c˜i1i2bn + (−1)ka+kb c˜i1i2abbn] +
∑
i1<i2<i3
i1,i2,i3 6=a,b
P [(−1)ka c˜i1i2i3abn + (−1)kb c˜i1i2i3bbn]
+ · · ·+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN−1
i1,i2,...iN−1 6=a,b
P [(−1)ka c˜i1i2···iN−1abn + (−1)kb c˜i1i2···iN−1bbn] +
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN
i1,i2,...iN 6=a,b
P (c˜i1i2···iN bn)
(75)
We denote p2i1i2i3···ikt =
∑
n=odd |c˜i1i2i3···iktn|2 where k = 1, 2, 4, 6, . . . , N . And the upper bound of IAE is
IAE =
∑
a<bQabI
a,b
AE∑
a<bQab
≤ 1∑
a<bQab
∑
a<b
∑
n=odd
[ϕ(|c˜i1an|2 + |c˜i1bn|2, |c˜aban|2 + |c˜abbn|2)
+
∑
i1 6=a,b
ϕ(|c˜i1aan|2 + |c˜i1bbn|2, |c˜i1ban|2 + |c˜i1bbn|2)
+
∑
i1<i2,i1,i2 6=a,b
ϕ(|c˜i1i2an|2 + |c˜i1i2bn|2, |c˜i1i2aban|2 + |c˜i1i2abbn|2)
+
∑
i1<i2<i3
i1,i2i3 6=a,b
ϕ(|c˜i1i2i3aan|2 + |c˜i1i2i3bbn|2, |c˜i1i2i3abn|2 + |c˜i1i2i3ban|2) + . . . . . .
+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN−1
i1,i2,··· ,iN−1 6=a,b
ϕ(|c˜i1i2i3···iN−1aan|2 + |c˜i1i2i3···iN−1bbn|2, c˜i1i2i3···iN−1abn|2 + |c˜i1i2i3···iN−1ban|2)]
≤ 1∑
a<bQab
∑
a<b
[ϕ(p2i1a + p
2
i1b, p
2
aba + p
2
abb) +
∑
i1 6=a,b
ϕ(p2i1aa + p
2
i1bb, p
2
i1ba + p
2
i1ab)
+
∑
i1<i2,i1,i2 6=a,b
ϕ(p2i1i2a + p
2
i1i2b, p
2
i1i2abb + p
2
i1i2aba) +
∑
i1<i2<i3
i1,i2i3 6=a,b
ϕ(p2i1i2i3aa + p
2
i1i2i3bb, p
2
i1i2i3ab + p
2
i1i2i3ba)
+ . . . · · ·+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN−1
i1,i2,··· ,iN−1 6=a,b
ϕ(p2i1i2i3···iN−1aa + p
2
i1i2i3···iN−1bb, p
2
i1i2i3···iN−1ab + p
2
i1i2i3···iN−1ba)],
(76)
where
Qab =
∑
n=odd
[(|c˜i1an|2 + |c˜i1bn|2) +
∑
i1<i2
(|c˜i1i2an|2 + |c˜i1i2bn|2) +
∑
i1<i2<i3<i4
(|c˜i1i2i3i4an|2 + |c˜i1i2i3i4bn|2)
+ · · ·+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN
(|c˜i1i2i3···iNan|2 + |c˜i1i2i3···iN bn|2)]
=p2i1a + p
2
i1b +
∑
i1<i2
(p2i1i2a + p
2
i1i2b) +
∑
i1<i2<i3<i4
(p2i1i2i3i4a + p
2
i1i2i3i4b)
+ · · ·+
∑
i1<i2<i3<···<iN
(p2i1i2...iNa + p
2
i1i2...iN b)
(77)
17
As shown in Eq. (54) of supplementary note of Ref. [21], we have the following mathematical identities∑
a<b
p2i1a + p
2
i1b = (L − 1)
∑
i2
p2i1i2
∑
a<b
p2aba + p
2
abb =
∑
i1<i2
i2∑
i3=i1
p2i1i2i3
∑
a<b
∑
i1 6=a,b
p2i1aa + p
2
i1bb = (L− 2)
∑
i1<i2
i2∑
i3=i1
p2i1i2i3∑
a<b
∑
i1<i2<···<ik
i1,i2,...,ik 6=a,b
p2i1i2···ika + p
2
i1i2···ikb = (L− k − 1)
∑
i1<i2<···<ik
∑
t6=i1,i2,...,ik
p2i1i2···ikt
∑
a<b
∑
i1<i2<···<ik
i1,i2,...,ik 6=a,b
p2i1i2···ikaba + p
2
i1i2···ikabb = (k + 1)
∑
i1<i2<···<ik+2
ik+2∑
t=i1
p2i1i2···ik+2t
∑
a<b
∑
i1<i2<···<ik+1
i1,i2,...,ik+1 6=a,b
p2i1i2···ik+1aa + p
2
i1i2···ik+1bb
= (L− k − 2)
∑
i1<i2<···<ik+2
ik+2∑
t=i1
p2i1i2···ik+2t
∑
a<b
∑
i1<i2<···<ik+1
i1,i2,...,ik+1 6=a,b
p2i1i2···ik+1ab + p
2
i1i2···ik+1ba
= (k + 2)
∑
i1<i2<···<ik+2
∑
t6=i1··· ,ik+2
p2i1i2···ik+2t,
where k = 2, 4, 6, . . . , N . And we define
x1 ≡
∑
i2
p2i1i2
x2 ≡
∑
i1<i2
i2∑
i3=i1
p2i1i2i3
xk ≡
∑
i1<i2<···<ik
ik∑
t=i1
p2i1i2···ikt
xk+1 ≡
∑
i1<i2<···<ik
∑
t6=i1,...,ik
p2i1i2···ikt
It is easy to check
∑
a<bQab = (L− 1)(x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xN+1). With the concavity of ϕ(x, y) and Jensens inequality,
we have
IAE ≤
∑N
k=1 ϕ[(L − k)xk, kxk+1]
(L− 1)∑N+1k=1 xk , (78)
By searching the maximum value of Eq. (78) in non-negative spaces,we could get the upper bound of IAE . Eq. (68)
and Eq. (78) are actually the same, i.e., the expression of IAE is just Eq. (78) whether N is an odd number or even
number.
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IV. THE SIMULATION MODEL OF RRDPS WITH SINGLE PHOTON DETECTORS
If Alice prepares the L-pulses trains with phase-randomized weak coherent state source with intensity µ and Bob’s
detectors are single photon detectors in RRDPS, the counting rate and error counting rate [21] are
Qµ =
L−1∑
r=1
L− r
L− 1(1− pd)
2L−2r−1e−(L−r)ηµ/L(ηµ/L+ 2pd), (79)
Tµ =
L−1∑
r=1
L− r
L− 1(1 − pd)
2L−2r−1e−(L−r)ηµ/Lpd. (80)
And the error rate is Eµ = Tµ/Qµ. The final key rate of RRDPS with single photon detectors is
LR = Qµ(1− fH(Eµ))− esrc − (Q− esrc)φ(nth, L), (81)
where esrc =
∑
k>nth
µke−µ
k! and
φ(N,L) = max
x1,x2,...,xN+1

N∑
k=1
ϕ((L − k)xk, kxk+1)
L− 1
 , (82)
and
∑N+1
k=1 xk = 1.
V. THE SIMULATION MODELS OF RRDPS WITH YES-NO DETECTORS
If Alice prepares the L-pulses trains with phase-randomized weak coherent state source with intensity µ and Bob’s
detectors are single photon detectors in RRDPS, the counting rate and error counting rate are
Qµ =
L−1∑
r=1
L− r
L− 1(1− pd)
2L−2r−1e−
ηµ(L−r−1)
L [1− (1 − pd)e−
ηµ
L ], (83)
Tµ =
L−1∑
r=1
L− r
L− 1pd(1− pd)
2L−2r−1e−
ηµ(L−r)
L . (84)
Eqs. (60) and (71) clearly show that the bit-flip error rate of even-counts is 0.5 no matter what Eve does. And thus
the final secure key rate is
LR = max
γ
min
α
{γmax[R1(α), 0] + (1 − γ)max[R2(α), 0]},
s.t. 1− 2EQ
Q− esrc ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1,
R1(α) = α(Qµ − esrc)(1− φ(nth, L))− fQµH(Eµ),
R2(α) = (1− α)(Qµ − esrc)− fQµH(Eµ),
(85)
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